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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
could hold a religious belief as making a person incompetent, could not the
state then actually circumvent the constitutional ban on interfering with
the belief itself? The concept of the state stepping into a person's re-
ligious life "for his own good" is repugnant to the spirit of the first
amendment.
As the law stands today, there is no legal justification for this kind
of interference, and the expansion of any of the doctrines discussed, in
any general way, would be an excessive infringement upon the personal
liberties of the individual guaranteed under the first amendment.
RICHARD L. BEATTY.
ADDITUR, AS A MEANS OF MODIFYING A JURY DAMAGE AWARD, NOT
RECOGNIZED IN MONTNA.-The State of Montana, acting through its State
Highway Commission, plaintiff, condemned land belonging to the de-
fendant. The commission appointed by the parties to appraise the land
awarded defendant $50,000, and plaintiff appealed. A jury awarded de-
fendant $30,000 in district court, whereupon defendant appealed, deem-
ing the award inadequate. Finding a new trial justified on the grounds
of inadequacy,' the trial court judge gave plaintiff the option of either
consenting to entry of judgment in the sum of $37,897.45, in which event
defendant's motion for a new trial would be denied, or granting the mo-
tion for retrial. Plaintiff appealed, contending the court had no author-
ity to compel such an election. Held, the trial court abused its discretion
in attempting to exercise the power of additure. State Highway Comm'n
v. Schmidt, 391 P.2d 692 (Mont. 1964).
Additur is the procedure by which the trial court, with the consent
of the defendant, increases the amount of an inadequate jury award, as
a condition to denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.2 Remittitur is
the analogous practice used to decrease the amount of a jury verdict.
The two procedures are employed only when the court is in a position to
,REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947 § 93-5603 enumerates the grounds for a new
trial: I I... (5) Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice; (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision, or that it is against the law. . .. "' While excessive damages is a
ground (subdivision 5), the party who wishes to appeal an inadequate award must
move on the ground of 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict," under
subdivision 6. Flaherty v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 42 Mont. 89, 111 Pac. 348 (1910).
This anomaly is a product of the common law and is discussed in a California deci-
sion, Phillips v. Lyon, 109 Cal. App. 264, 292 Pac. 711 (1930). REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA are hereinafter cited R.C.M.
2 For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that sufficient grounds exist for
a new trial. Also, the terms "additur" and 'remittitur" will be defined in the
conditional sense, i.e., one party is given the option to consent to a modification of
the award, or submitting to a new trial. The option is given to defendant if plaintiff
moves for a new trial, and to plaintiff if defendant so moves. Attempts to go beyond
conditional use and arbitrarily modify damage awards without either party's consent
have been declared unconstitutional. E.g., Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889);
Bourne v. Moore, 77 Utah 184, 292 Pac. 1102 (1930); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193
Wis. 324, 214 N.W. 431 (1927).
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grant a new trial because the award is inadequate or excessive. If the
motion for retrial is based on another ground, additure or rernittitur may
not be used.
Remittitur and additur, founded on the court's discretionary power
to grant a new trial, are the result of a historical trend characterized by
increased control over jury verdicts. The earliest procedure altering a
verdict was "attaint," appearing in the fifteenth century.3 After attaint
was abandoned, the courts assumed the power to grant a new trial when
an excessive award reflected jury prejudice.4 Later the requirement of
prejudice was discarded.5 The inadequate award, however, was ap-
proached with great reluctance, and not until 1843 was a new trial allowed
on this ground.6 Once the English courts became accustomed to granting
new trials when verdicts were unsatisfactory, remittitur,7 and then addi-
tur,8 were approved. The House of Lords terminated the use of both pro-
cedures on constitutional grounds in 1905. 9
In the United States today, remittitur is recognized in federal' °
and most state courts.' The validity of additur, however, has been hotly
disputed, and its status remains uncertain. 12 A statistical listing of the
jurisdictions allowing its use is of little value in view of the confused con-
'The dissatisfied litigant assembled a grand jury of twenty-four knights to review
the decision, and the first jury was harshly punished if the verdict was changed.
McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 6, at 25 (1935 ed.). The members of the first jury were
declared infamous, sent to prison, their goods and possessions confiscated, houses
destroyed, woods felled, and meadows plowed up. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *
404.
'Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655). "Windham on the other side
pressed for a new trial, and said it was a packed business, else there could not have
been so great damages."
'Wilford v. Berkeley, 97 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1758). The court said the jury was
outrageous in giving damages greatly exceeding the injury.
'Armytage v. Haley, 114 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Q.B. 1843).
7Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q.B. Div. 356, 358 (1884), (Brett, M.R.): "Divisional Court
can grant or refuse a new trial without the consent of the defendant, if the plaintiff
consents that the verdict should be reduced to an amount which the court does not
think would be excessive if it had been given by the jury."
"Additur was at first given approval in dicta only. See Belt v. Lawes, supra note
7, at 250. "But I am by no means prepared to say that the court might not, under
certain circumstances, refuse to grant a new trial if a defendant would consent that
the verdict would stand for larger damages than the jury had given." In Armytage
v. Haley, supra note 6, plaintiff was awarded one farthing and obtained a rule to
show cause why a new trial should not be had, unless defendant would consent to the
damages being increased to 101. 5s. 6d. No conclusion can be reached as to whether
additur was ever fully accepted at common law. See majority and minority opinions
in Dimicc v. Schiedt, infra note 21. Additur was granted absolutely at common law
in cases involving (1) mayhem, upon view of the wound, (2) upon writ of inquiry,
(3) debt, where plaintiff's demand was certain. Dimick v. Schiedt, infra note 21, at
477.
'Watt v. Watt, [1905] A.C. 115, 119. " [T]he court has no jurisdiction to fix the
amount of damages without the consent of both of the parties."
"Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889).
UMc!CCORMICK, supra note 3, § 19, at 78 n.10.
"'The most accurate summary of the decisions involving the question under an-
notation [additur] is that no broad general rules can safely be formulated." See
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213, 219 (1957).
1964]
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dition of the law in this regard. 13 Most jurisdictions allowing additur
confine its use to cases where the amount in question is undisputed or
liquidated. 14 In New York, for example, additur is allowed, but the in-
creased award must be set at the maximum amount the jury could find
as a matter of law.'5 A variation of the New York procedure is used in
Wisconsin, where a new trial is granted unless plaintiff consents to a
judgment for the least amount the jury could find, or the defendant
consents to judgment for the greatest amount the jury could award.16
This system seems the most reasonable as it gives either party the power
to prevent a new trial.17 After many years of upholding additur, Califor-
nia condemned it in a personal injury action,' 8 though it is still accepted
where damages are liquidated19 as well as in eminent domain proceed-
ings. 20
The leading decision in the United States, which was heavily relied
upon in the instant case, is Dimick v. Schiedt.2 1 In that case, decided in
1935, the Supreme Court held that federal courts, bound by the seventh
amendment, 22 were restricted to the common law existing at the time the
Constitution was adopted. Finding no precedent in the common law
18Comparison is made impossible by the myriad of fact situations presented and the
uncertainty of the legitimacy of additur in different jurisdictions. Under certain
circumstances, a majority seems to sanction additur. Some of the circumstances
which effect the allowance of additur are: (1) whether the damages are liquidated or
unliquidated, (2) whether additur is used to correct an error in computation, or a
typographical or clerical error, (3) whether a particular instruction to the jury may
have been omitted by the court, (4) whether the jury violated an instruction from
the court, (5) whether the appellate court has the same power of additur as the trial
court. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213 (1957).
"E.g., Shaffer v. Great American Indem. Co., 147 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1945).
"O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956). If the modified
award is set at the highest amount recoverable by law, the issue is transformed
from one of fact to one of law. In this way, the right to jury trial objection is
circumvented.
"6Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270, 248 N.W. 127 (1933). For example, the jury might
return a verdict of $600. Plaintiff, objecting to the award as too small, moves
for a new trial. The court estimates the lower and upper limits within which the
jury could have found as $700 and $1000, respectively, and gives plaintiff the option
of accepting $700, and defendant the option of paying $1000. If neither accepts, a
new trial is granted.
"In deciding whether to consent, each party takes into account the amount of the
disputed award, the upper and lower limits set by the court in offering additur, and
the probable expense of retrial. One of the parties is likely to find consent ad-
vantageous. As a criterion, the Wisconsin courts set the limits at the highest and
lowest "sum an unprejudiced jury would probably find." Risch v. Lawhead, supra
note 16, 248 N.W. at 130. At first impression, this standard might seem to wrest
more authority from the jury. However, courts are not only more experienced at
estimating possible awards to fit particular fact situations, but in setting limits for
additur, the courts are exercising no more control over the jury than they do in
granting a new trial when an award is inadequate.
"Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
"9Pierce v. Schaden, 62 Cal. 283 (1882).
'Adamson v. Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. App. 125, 198 Pae. 52 (1921).
-293 U.S. 474 (1935); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1150 (1935).
''In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the
common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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which unequivocally permitted additur,23 federal courts were precluded
from its use.2 4 Rejecting the argument that additur is a corollary of
remittitur, the Court distinguished the two procedures:
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a re-
mission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible sup-
port in the view that what remains is included in the verdict
along with the unlawful excess ... and that the reinittitur has the
effect of merely lopping off an excresence. But where the verdict
is too small, an increase by the court is a bald addition of some-
thing which in no sense can be said to be included in the ver-
dict.
25
A powerful dissenting group composed of Chief Justice Hughes, and
Justices Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo, strongly urged the acceptance of
additur on the ground of its analogy to remittitur:
The defendant, who has formally consented to pay the increased
amount cannot complain. The plaintiff has suffered no denial
of a right because the court, staying its hand, has left the verdict
undisturbed, as it lawfully might have done if the defendant re-
fused to pay more than the verdict . . . in neither case does the
jury return a verdict for the amount actually recovered, and in
both the amount of the recovery was fixed, not by the verdict,
but by the consent of the party resisting the motion for a new
trial.
26
Conceding that the common law contained no precise rule on the subject,
the minority felt that no injustice would be done by applying the prin-
ciple of remittitur to an inadequate award.
It appears unfortunate that the Montana Supreme Court has adopted
the least progressive view because (1) the Dimick rule is not binding, (2)
should the Dimick rule be binding, it would not be applicable to the prin-
cipal case, and (3) the decision in the instant case might have been better
reasoned.
First, in deciding the instant case, the Montana Supreme Court ap-
peared to rely solely on Dimick v. Schiedt. The Dimick holding does not
bind Montana in its appraisal of additur, for the seventh amendment
applies only to federal courts2 and has not been incorporated under the
'See note 8, supra.
"Indicating disapproval of both remittitur and additur, the Supreme Court criticized
the former as "a practice which has been condemned as opposed to the principles of
the common law by every reasoned English decision .... [I]f the question of remit-
titur were now before us for the first time it would be decided otherwise." Dimick
v. Schiedt, supra note 21, at 484.
'Id. at 486. The majority was composed of Justices Sutherland, Devanter, MeRey-
nolds, Butler and Roberts.
-GId. at 494.
'Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
1964]
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 28 Also, the Montana
Constitution has omitted the phrase "no fact tried by jury shall otherwise
be re-examined ... than according to the rules of the common law" which
is found in the United States Constitution. 29 Therefore, Montana is not
restricted by either common law precedent, or its own constitution in con-
sidering additur.
30
Second, authority exists that the principle of Dimick v. Schiedt is not
applicable in an eminent domain proceeding if the condemnor agrees to
additur. In United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battelfield Assn.,31 a
federal court of appeals distinguished the Dimick rule in affirming an
award increased by additur. The court noted that the seventh amendment
does not apply to condemnation proceedings since condemnation was un-
known to the common law. Also, since there is no right to jury trial, there
can be no objection to additur as infringing on the jury province. Thus,
the Kennesaw decision approving additur, which California follows, 3 2 seems
much more applicable to the facts of the instant case.33
Third, the holding puts Montana in the incongruous position of con-
doning remittitur and condemning additur.34 To support its decision, the
Montana Supreme Court employed the reasoning found in Dimick v.
Schiedt: in remittitur the final award is part of a larger sum set by the
jury, whereas additur is an addition of something new. Such reasoning
appears fallacious, for in neither case is the final award that set by the
jury. In both instances it is the judge who, with the consent of one liti-
gant, substitutes his determination of the damages for that of the jury.3
The objection that the application of additur invades the jury province as
finder of fact appears questionable if remittitur is to be accepted. Also,
judges constantly determine fact issues in admitting and excluding evi-
dence, in determining the court's jurisdiction, in passing on pleadings,
and in interpreting documents.
36
By the instant holding, the Montana Supreme Court has rejected the
opportunity to adopt an expedient method of cutting trial expense and
"-Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917).
-"MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23 provides, "The right of trial by jury shall be secured
to all, and remain inviolate . .. ."
'Montana courts may be precluded from this line of reasoning since it has been held
that the right guaranteed by article III section 23, is the same as that guaranteed
by the seventh amendment to the Federal Constitution. Chessman v. Hale, 31 Mont.
577, 79 Pac. 254 (1905).
3199 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1938).
" 2Adamson v. Los Angeles County, supra note 20.
There is no right of jury trial in condemnation proceedings in Montana. In re Valley
Center Drain Dist., 64 Mont. 545, 211 Pac. 218 (1922).
"Chief Justice Harrison and Justice Castles, concurring in the principal case at 696,
express the opinion that additur might be used in certain situations.
'"Another distinction offered is that in remittitur, plaintiff, free of contributory
negligence, is given the option; in additur, a negligent defendant is given the option.
Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 186.
:Justice Traynor, dissenting in Dorsey v. Barba, supra note 18, at 613 also points out
that in equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, bankruptcy, and administrative cases,
there is no right of jury trial at all.
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limiting litigation. Moreover, the effect of the decision is to aggrevate
the plight of the litigant who objects to an inadequate award. His only
recourse is an entire new trial, since under Montana law a party is pre-
cluded from a retrial on the issue of the damages alone.3 7 However,
partial retrials on damages are allowed in federal courts and some state
courts which utilize the same rules of civil procedure as are presently
used in Montana.38 No reason exists why Montana could not interpret
Rule 5939 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in the same manner,
especially if additur is denied. Therefore, though Rule 59 does not sanc-
tion additur,40 it might be employed to remand on the issue of damages
alone.
It appears that a contrary result could have been reached in the
principal case if the court had recognized that remittitur and additur
are analogous procedures, the merit of additur as a device for ending liti-
gation and saving expense, and the invalidity of objections on a constitu-
tional basis if the defendant consents. Where there is no right to a jury
trial in the first place, the reason for denying additur seems even more
unrealistic.
It is submitted that the use of remittitur is justified, especially in
light of the widespread acceptance of remittitur. In order to resolve the
inconsistency of denying additur and permitting remittitur, the court
might modify the rule of the instant case and permit additur in Montana.
In accord with the practice in other jurisdictions, additur could be em-
ployed in certain circumstances, for example:
'The Montana Supreme Court has held that where there is but one cause of action,
'the verdict . . . is a single entity which must stand or fall as a whole." Seibel
v. Byers, 136 Mont. 39, 45, 344 P.2d 129, 133 (1959). English courts also hold that
a judgment is indivisible. 39 Am. JuR. New Trial § 21 (1942).
T Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1953). The partial new trial is strictly limited to cases
where the issue of damages is distinct from other issues, and there is no possibility
that the inadequate award is the result of jury compromise with the question of
liability.
' MONT. R. Crv. P. 59(a) provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part
of the issues for any of the reasons provided by the statutes of the State of
Montana. On motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may take additional testimony, amend the findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, set aside, vacate, modify or confirm
any judgment that may have been entered or direct the entry of a new judgment.
"In the principal case, the defendant's contention that MONT. R. Civ. P. 59, supra note
39, vested Montana courts with the power of additur was without authority and
properly discredited by the court. It has been noted that additur, when allowed,
follows plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Rule 59 does not purport to govern new
trials, but refers expressly to R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5603, which enumerates the grounds
for a new trial, and has not been altered by the adoption of the new rules of civil
procedure. Thus, no part of Rule 59 can be construed as extending the power of the
court to effect additur, adversely or beneficially. Although the phrase "amend or
make new findings of fact and conclusions of law" does appear in the rule, these
powers are confined to actions tried without a jury. Since additur alters a, jury find-
ing, Rule 59 has no connection with additur. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have been interpreted in a like manner. Federal courts have held that Federal Rule
59 does not set forth the grounds for a new trial, but merely affirms prior law.
35B C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 1061 (1960). Aerated Products Co. of Los
Angeles v. Aeration Processes, 95 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal. 1952). Further, the enact-
ment of the federal rules has had no impact on the earlier decisions dealing with
remittitur. Rice v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 82 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Neb. 1949).
1964]
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1. Allow additur if the increased award is set at the highest
amount a jury could award, similar to the New York pro-
cedure ;41
2. Adopt the Wisconsin practice of giving both parties the option
-the defendant to pay the highest amount, or plaintiff to
accept the lowest amount the jury could award as a matter of
law ;42
3. Allow additur only in cases involving liquidated damages;
4. Permit additur only in action in which there is no constitu-
tional right of jury trial, such as condemnation proceedings.
43
If additur is to be denied altogether, the court should consider the pos-
sibility of new trials on the issue of damages alone under Rule 59 of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the historical trend toward increasing supervision of the
courts over jury verdicts, and the almost universal acceptance of re-
mittitur, it is difficult to justify rules which favor correction of an ex-
cessive award but not of an inadequate award. When wisely used in civil
actions, additur avoids the delay and expense of a new trial, and furthers
the legitimate objective of bringing litigation to a speedy and expeditious
end.
GARY L. DAVIS.
PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS
ESTABLISHED A NEW AND IMPORTANT AREA OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-
Petitioner, the New York Times, carried a full page advertisement on
March 9, 1960, entitled, "Heed Their Rising Voices."' The advertisement
made several false and defamatory statements of fact concerning the
activities of the Montgomery, Alabama police. Respondent, the commis-
sioner of police in Montgomery, brought an action for defamation in
Alabama state court, alleging that the statements referred to him in his
official capacity. The trial court found the publication "libelous per se"
and upon proof that the statements were "of and concerning" him, the





"Accord, Kennesaw decision, supra note 31.
'This was an editorial advertisement submitted by a group of civil rights advocates
for the purpose of raising money for the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King
and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. See appendix of majority opinion for
full text of the advertisement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
'At the time this decision was handed down, there were pending in the state courts
of Alabama eleven suits against the respondent in which the aggregate damages
sought were $5,600,000. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 734.
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